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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
THE BOl\RD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF EMPLOYMEtJT SECURITY, INDUSTRIAL) 
C0!-1'-lISSION OF UTAH; JOHN I. ) 
JOHNSON; and AUSTIN c. NOLISA, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. 16655 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah seeking judicial review of a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which 
determined cJ aiman ts John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa to be 
qualified to receive unemployment benefits from December 17, 
1978 to January 27, 1979. 
DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant-claimants John I. Johnson and Austin C. 
Molisa filed claims for unemployment compensation which were 
granted by representatives of the Department of Employment 
Security. The decision entitling claimants to receive benefits 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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.. 
was, following plaintiff's timely appeal, reversed by the 
Appeal Referee. The defendant-claimants appe2led and the Boarc 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah reversed the 
decision of the Appeal Referee and reaffirmed the decisioo of 
the Department Representative allowing the Clefencant-claimants 
to receive unemployment benefits. Plaintiff's Petition for 
Reconsideration and Request for Oral Argument was denied by t~,' 
Board of Review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff petitions this court to reverse the decisic• 
of the Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 
Industrial Commission of Utah and determine that 
defendant-claimants John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa were 
ineligible to receive unempJ oymen t benefits from December 19, 
1978 to January 27, 1979, and that the overpayments receivedh 
said claimants be repaid or deducted from future unemployment 
benefits received. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa voluntarily 
terminat~d their employment with Pepperidge Farm, Inc. on 
Septer.:ber 23, 1978. Mr. Johnson had been employed by plaintif' 
since June, 1976 while Mr. Nolisa had been in plaintiff's 
employ since March, 1976. At the time of their voluntary 
termination, both claimants were employed full-time and held 
the position of Plant Services "B" employees at a wage of $4.i
1 
per hour. 
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Pepperidge Farm began manufacturing operations in 
Richmond, Utah in 1974. Job classifications were established 
according to the practices of other Pepperidge Farm plants in 
other areas of the country. As the plant management became 
acquainted with its own operations and employment needs, it 
became apparent that some job reclassifications were necessary. 
A management committee reviewed job responsibilities 
in August, 1977, and certain employee positions were 
reclassified. At the time of this review, claimants Johnson 
and Nolisa were employed on the afternoon shift as Plant 
Services Helpers. As a result of the committees review, the 
job classification of Plant Services Helper was divided into 
two separate groups or job classifications: "Plant Services A" 
2nd "Plant Services B". The "A" group was given higher pay due 
to their greater responsibilities. 
When reclassification occurred, claimants Johnson and 
~lisa were not working the same shift as those employees 
reclassified as Plant Services "A". Consequently, the 
defendant-claimants remained in the Plant Services "B" group 
and their wages were not increa8ed since their responsibilities 
were different from those in the "A" group. Claimants 
requested a reconsideration of their positions on two separate 
occassions. Both times the committee determined that the 
distinction between the job classifications of Plant Services 
"B" and Plant Services "A" employees was proper and appropriate. 
- 3 -
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., 
On at least five separate occassions subsequent tot~ 
job reclassifications, both claimants had an opportunity to bid 
for the position of Plant Services "A". Neither claimant made 
any effort to bid for this position and consequently, both 
remained in group "B". 
On August 29, 1978 claimants Johnson and Nolisa were 
both disciplined for failure to carry through or accept 
direction from their supervisors. Claimant Johnson was 
suspended for two days without pay for insubordination. 
Claimant Nolisa was suspended for five days without pay. 
At the time of his suspension, Nolisa informed 
plaintiff that he was going to quit anyway to go back to school 
and that he planned to terminate on September 23, 1979. 
Claimant Johnson also gave notice at the time of his suspension, 
of his intent to voluntarily terminate on September 23, 1979, 
stating that he also was returning to school. 
Subsequent to their suspension, both claimants 
returned to their regular employment until they voluntari~ 
quit on September 23, 1979 as planned. When presented with 
discharge slips which indicated their reason for terminati~ e 
"quitting to return to school", both claimants refused to 
accept the discharge slips and requested that they be rewritten i 
to state that the claimants had "resigned", which plaintiff did. 
The defendant-claimants filed claims for unemployment 
benefits with the Utah Department of Employment Security durin~ 
the month of November, 1978, requesting eligibility for 
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b~efits from the date of their voluntary termination of 
employment with plaintiff. A Department Representative of the 
defendant-Industrial Commission determined both claimants 
eligible to receive unemployment compensation effective 
December 17, 1978 on the grounds that their separations were 
not disqualifying. 
Upon learning that the defendant-claimants had applied 
for unemployment benefits and had been determined eligible to 
receive compensation, plaintiff appealed the decision of the 
~partment Representative. A hearing with the Appeal Referee 
in the Appeals Office of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
De par tmen t of Employment Security, was held in Logan, Utah on 
Fehruary 8, 1979. 
The Appeal Referee determined that claimants Johnson 
Md Nolisa had voluntarily terminated their employment with 
plaintiff without good cause and had received unemployment 
benefits to which they were not entitled. The Appeal Referee 
reversed the decision of the Department Representative and 
determined that both claimants were disqualified from receiving 
unemplovment compensation from December 17, 1978 to January 27, 
1979 pursuant to Section 35-4-S(a) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. The reversal also provided that the overpayments 
received by the defendant-claimants would be deducted from any 
future unemployment benefits received by them after January 27, 
inq. 
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The defendant-claimants appealed the decision of the 
Appeal Referee to the Board of Review, Industrial Commission of 
Utah, and submitted to the Board of Review a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities dated March 27, 1979, a Motion for 
Admission of Affidavits dated March 22, 1979, and Affidavits 
dated March 14, 1979. Plaintiff filed a Responsive Memorandum 
with the Board of Review dated May 18, 1979, in addition to a 
Notice of Right Reserved to File Counter Affidavits dated May 
18, 1979, and an Affidavit dated May 25, 1979. 
The Board of Review in a split decision, James F. 
Hannon dissenting, reversed the decision of the Appeal Referee 
and affirmed the decision of the Department Representative in 
ruling that the defendant-claimants voluntarily left work with 
good cause and were eligible to receive unemployment benefits 
effective December 17, 1978. The Board of Review declined~ 
reconsider its decision despite plaintiff's Petition for 
Reconsideration and Request for Oral Argument dated July 18, 
1979. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT 
CLAIMANTS HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR VOLUNTARILY 
TERMINATING THEIR EMPLOYMENT WITH PLAINTIFF 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on more than one 
• 
occassion that where a decision of the Industrial Commission 
concerning the right of a claimant to receive unemployment 
reversal 
compensation is unsupported by substantial evidence, a 
- 6 -
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of the order is appropriate. Martinez v. Board of Review, 
Department of Employment Security, 25 Utah 2d 131, 477 P.2d 587 
(1970); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees v. Department of 
Ernoloyment Security, 13 Utah 2d 262, 372 P. 2cl 987 (1962). 
Indeed, a reversal of the decision of the Board of Review, 
Industrial Commission of Utah is justified in the instant case. 
Although the defendant-claimants maintain that their 
voluntary termination of employment with Pepperidge Farm was 
justified and not disqualifying, the evidence on record fails 
to support a finding that claimants Johnson and Nolisa quit 
their employr.ien t with good cause. 
Claimants have alleged that they were forced to 
terminate their employment with plaintiff and that they were 
harrassed and mistreated by plaintiff. (R. 00068, 00069, 
00070, 00072, 00073, 00074). The evidence, however, 
establishes that the defendant-claimants were not forced to 
guit their jobs but rather terminated their employment with 
plain tiff voluntarily and of their own free will. 
After quitting their jobs with plaintiff, both 
claimants filed with the defendant-Industrial Commission to 
receive unemployment benefits. The claims for benefits 
submitted by defendants Johnson and Nolisa did not state that 
they were forced to leave plaintiff's employment. Not only did 
the claimants make no mention of the now alleged harrassment 
and mistreatment, but both claimants indicated on their claims 
ii for unemployment benefits that their reason for unemployment 
was simply that they "Quit". (R. 00123, 00124). 
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The defendant-claimants voluntarily tf'rminated their 
employment with plaintiff in order to return to school, not 
because of any pressure, harrassment, mistreatment or force on 
the part of plaintiff. Both claimants, well in advance of 
their termination date, informed plaintiff that they were 
quitting to return to school. (R. 00038, 00082, 00085, 00091, 
00101). 
Claimant Johnson commenced work for plaintiff in June, 
1976 as a Plant Services Helper, later reclassified as a PlMt 
Services "B" employee. ( R. 0 0 0 3 8 , 0 0 0 4 2 , 0 0 0 6 7 , 0 0 0 6 8) . In 
August, 1978, Johnson was suspended for two days without pay 
for insubordination. (R. 00037, 00042). At the time of his 
suspension he stated that he was "going to quit." When asked 
why, he responded, "I am going back to school." Johnson stated 
that his last day of employment with plaintiff would be 
September 23, 1979. (R. 00042, 00082, 00085, 00091). 
Claimant Nolisa began working for plaintiff in May, 
1976 as a production worker and later became a Plant Services 
Helper, reclassified as a Plant Services "B" employee. (R. 
00038, 00043, 00072). Nolisa was insubordinate to his foreman 
on August 28, 1978 and was suspended for five days without 
pay. (R. 00037, 00072, 00073). At the time of his suspension, 
Nolisa informed plaintiff that he was quitting anyway and 
planned to leave September 23, 1978 in order to return to 
school. (R. 00037, 00038, 00043, 00091). 
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That the defendant-claimants voluntarily terminated 
their employment with plain tiff so that they could return to 
school was further pointed out by the testimony of Dale stokes, 
Prrsonnel Manager of Pepperidge Farm, at the hearing whith the 
Appeal Referee on February 8, 1978: 
On August 29, 1978, both John Johnson and Austin 
Nolisa gave notice to Pepperidge Farms of their 
impending termination. They both stated at that time, 
they would be resigning. Their last day of work would 
he September 23, 1978. Their resignation was due to 
the fact that they were going to return to school on a 
full-time basis. On September 23, 1978, they did in 
fact work their last day. 
(R. 00091). 
Following their suspension, claimants returned to 
their work and continued working their regular shifts until 
September 23, 1978 when they both quit as they had planned. 
When the defendant-claimants were presented with their 
discharge slips upon termination, which indicated that they 
11·ere "quitting to return to school", claimants Johnson and 
~lisa refused to accept their discharge slips and requested 
plaintiff to rewrite them to indicate that they had "resigned", 
which plaintiff did. (R. 00042, 00043). 
The discharge slips prepared by plaintiff stated that 
the defendant-claimants were quitting to attend school since 
that was the reason plaintiff had been given by Johnson and 
~lisa. Concerning the circumstances of the claimants' 
separation, the testimony of Dale Stokes during the hearing 
with Appeal Referee is relevant: 
- 9 -
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Referee 
Stokes 
(R. 00091). 
Now, then since we have played the record prior 
lo the claimant and claimant's representative 
being sworn in, what had occurred prior to th · 
t · h . e1r 
en rv i~to t e he~rrn~, we will allow Mr. Stokes 
to con t~nu~ ~t this time as to the circumstances 
of the. individuals' separation and why they are 
appeal mg. 
~ecaus~ September 23, 1978 was on a Saturday, and 
is their last of work, both Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Nolisa were scheduled for exit interviews, as is 
normal procedure by the company, on Friday, 
September 22. When they came in for the exit 
interview, they were given the Utah Department of 
Employment Security Separation Notices, as 
required by law. Each of them refused to accept 
the notice, stating that they did not wish to· 
have it written as it was presented to them, in 
that it said that their reason for leaving was to 
go to school. Mr. Nolisa said that his first 
reason was, "he is tired of the discrimintory 
attitude in the plant." And secondarily, thathe 
was going to return to school. The company had 
no knowlegde of this contention prior to that 
time. Mr. ,1ohnson made no statement whatsoever. 
Subsequent to the termination in September of 
1978, both claimants filed for unemployment 
compensation. The Notice of Claim Filed states 
that the claimant reports the reason for 
separation from your- firm as "I left." That is 
true of both statements. Again, the claimants 
th is time gave no reason for termination. It is 
the company's contention that they left 
voluntarily without good cause for resignatioo 
and without compensable cause for resignatioo. 
That is the only question in this hearing so far 
as the company is concerned. 
The defendant-claimants have not denied that they 
informed plaintiff they were quitting to return to school, and 
the fact that ~laintiff prepared discharge slips for the 
claimants indicating that they were quitting to attend school 
is rele-vant to plaintiff's belief that claimants Johnson and 
Nolisa voluntarily left their jobs for that sole purpose, as 
was pointed out by the Appeal Referee during the hearing: 
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Green 
Referee 
Green 
Referee 
... The blue slip, in which I saw, you know, 
glanced at said, "To attend school.", you know, 
but based upon that contention, when the claimant 
was going to school for the whole of, still are 
going to school, then, you know, well, it is 
irrelevant to me. 
No, that is not necessarily irrelevant. This was 
the reason that they gave the employer that they 
were leaving at that time. That becomes, then, 
the reason he puts do•,m. 
Okay. And if that is the reason that he put down 
arbitrarily, and they didn't accept the blue slip 
for, it is also my contention that, because they 
did not accept the blue slip, it wasn't right. 
That doesn't change the fact that they both went 
to school, does it? 
(R. 00100, 00101). (Emphasis supplied) • 
That the claimants voluntarily quit their jobs with 
plaintiff to return to school is supported by more than 
substantial evidence. Both claimants informed plaintiff that 
they were quitting to return to school. (R. 00091). Both gave 
notice that they intended to quit well in advance of their 
actual termination date, indicating that their decision to 
leave was preplanned rather than the result of any force or 
harrassmen t by plain tiff. (R. 00042, 00043, 00082, 00085, 
00091). Claimants Johnson and Nolisa both terminated their 
employment with plain tiff on the exact day they had stated they 
would. (R. 00091, 00092). The claims for unemployment 
benefits submitted by both claimants to the 
defendant-Industrial Commission stated only that they had 
"Quit". (R. 00123, 00124). Furthermore, the discharge slips 
Prepared by plaintiff for the defendant-claimants upon their 
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termination indicated that both claimants were "quitting to 
return to school", as plaintiff had been toJd that they were. 
(R. 00091, 00100, 00101). Finally, both claimants began to 
attend school at Utah State University in Logan, Utah on a 
full-time basis on September 26, 1978, the Tuesday following 
the day they quit. (R. 00092). 
Despite the overwhelming evidence that claimants 
Johnson and Nolisa voluntarily quit to return to school, they 
claim that they quit due to unsatisfactory working conditions, 
consisting of their failure to obtain the status of Plant 
Services "A" employees. The record however, shows that the 
reclassification claimants complain of occurred at least 
sixteen months prior to their termination (R. 00031, 00033, 
00096) and that pursuant to the request of Johnson and Nolisa, 
plaintiff on two separate occasions reconsidered the 
reclassifications only to determine that they were proper a~ 
appropriate and that no changes were necessary. (R. 00039). 
The record further establishes that all of plaintiff's 
employees in the Plant Services "B" category, including the 
defendant-claimants, received the same hourly wage. (R. 00038, 
00097). Although the Plant Services "A" employees received a 
· · b · ] · · · t s k i' 11 s and higher wage, their responsi i _1t1es require grea er 
abilities than those required of the Plant Services "B" 
h · and employees, such as the disassembly and assembly of mac ines 
equipment for cleaning purposes. (R. 00039, 00043). 
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Furthermore, the defendant-claimants each had the opportunity 
on at least five separate occasions to bid for the position of 
Plant Services "A" employee, yet neither claimant made any 
effort to do so. (R. 00039, 00044, 00099). 
The defendant-claimants voluntarily terminated their 
employment with plaintiff without force, harrassment or 
mistreatment. Both claimants left for the purpose of returning 
to school which they did. Furthermore, the job 
reclassification complained of by claimants was proper and 
necessary and within the province of the plaintiff-employer. 
Therefore, the evidence does not support a finding that 
claimants Johnson and Nolisa terminated their employment with 
good cause, and the decision of the Board of Review should be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
SECTION 35-4-5(a) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT DISQUALIFIES CLAIMANTS FROM 
RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FROM 
DECEMBER 17, 1978 to JANUARY 27, 1979 
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended provides: 
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits for the 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the 
commission, and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for such services equal to 
at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount; provided, that no claimant shall.be ineligible 
for benefits if the claimant leaves work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqt1ali f icat ion. 
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In the instant case, the defendant-claimants did not 
have good cause for voluntarily leaving their work with 
plaintiff. 
A. Claimants Terminated Employment to Return to School 
In Logan-Cache Knitting Mills v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 Utah 1, 102 P.2d 495 (1940), the Court enforced 
subdivision (a) of Utah Code Annotated § 35-4-5 in determini~ 
a claimant to be ineligible for unemployment benefits where it 
was established that he had left his job without good cause. 
The meaning of "good cause" as it applies to Section 35-4-S(a) 
has been discussed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Denby v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626 at 630 
(Utah 1977), this Court stated: 
The initial determination of "good cause," for 
voluntarily leaving employment, is a mixed question of 
law and fact for the administrative agency. A 
claimant has the burden of showing good cause for 
leaving, when he voluntarily terminates suitable 
employment. "Good cause" has been defined as "such 
cause as would similarly affect persons of reasonable 
and normal sensitivity, and is limited to those 
instances where the unemployment is caused by external 
pressures so comoelling that a reasonablv prudent 
person, exercising ordinary common sense and prud~~, 
would be justified in quitting under similar 
circumstances." (Emphasis supplied) . 
See also Miles v. Gronning, 581 P.2d 1334, 1338-1339 (Utah 
1978). 
It has been stated that the purpose of the Utah 
' · h f · · 1 reserves for Employment Security Act is 'to establ1s inanc1a 
the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their 
- 14 -
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own. Alvord v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, l 
Utah 2d 388, 267 P.2d 914 (1954). Although no Utah case 
~pears to be on point, other jurisdictions applying similar 
unemployment statutes have repeatedly held that the 
unemployment system cannot be used to subsidize an employee's 
education. 
In Keisling v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 181 A.2d 717 (Pa. 1962), the claimant had terminated 
his employment to allow him to complete his last year of 
Ehool. In ruling that the claimant was disqualified from 
receiving unemployment benefits, the court on page 718 of its 
opinion stated: 
However praiseworthy we may consider the thirst for 
knowledge to be, it has become abundantly clear that 
leaving employment to further one's education does not 
constitute leaving work for a cause of necessitous and 
compelling nature. 
The case of Fenstersheib v. Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review, 124 A. 2d 375 (Pa. 1956), also involved a 
claimant who had voluntarily left his employment to return to 
' school. In ruling against the claimant, the court on page 376, 
Proclaimed: 
While the desire to attend school is a laudable one, 
the termination of employment for that reason cannot 
be deemed "good cause". 
In Perales v. Department of Human Resources 
~lopment, 32 Cal.App. 3d 338, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 
ll 973J, the court held that voluntarily terminating ones 
- 15 -
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employment to return to school does not constitute "good cause' 
as required by the unemployment insurance system: 
Turning to the facts of the case at bench, we cannot 
say that quitting a job to attend school, no matter 
how personally commendable the step mav be, is an 
imperative and compelling reason of such magnitude as 
to render the claimant eligible for unemployment -
benefits, at least in the absence of explicit 
legislative authoritv. If this were good cause withir. 
the meaning of section 1256, untold numbers of persons 
could quit their jobs to attend school while receivina 
unemployment compensation benefits. However great mav 
be society's interest in furthering a working man's 
education, we find nothing in the Unemployment 
Insurance Law to sanction this objective •..• The 
unemplovment insurance system cannot be used to~ 
subsidize an emplovee 's education. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Other cases holding that leaving work to return to school does 
not satisfy the "good cause" requirement are Zook v. 
Unemployrnen t Compensation Board of Review, 188 A. 2d 783 (Pa. 
1963); Dreistadt v. Catherwood, 286 N.Y.S.2d 921, 29 A.D. 2d 
807 (1968); and Christophe v. Levine, 375 N. Y.S. 2d 483, 50 
A.D. 2d 705 (1975). 
In the instant case, claimants John son and Nolisa 
voluntarily left their work with plaintiff to return to 
school. As was pointed out above, the defendant-claimants 
informed plaintiff well in advance that they were quitting to 
return to school. (R. 00042, 00082, 00091). Both claimants 
terminated their employment with plain tiff on the date they had 
stated they would. (R. 00091, 00092). The discharge slips 
prepared for claimants by plaintiff indicated that both Johnson 
and Nolisa h.ad quit to return to school (R. 00091, 00100, 
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00101), and both claimants returned to school only three days 
after they quit. (R. 00092). 
Claimants maintain that they did not leave to return 
~ school since they had been attending school during the 
entire period of their employment with plaintiff. (R. 00069, 
00073). However, neither claimant had been attending school 
during the summer of 1978, nor were they enrolled at the time 
they informed plaintiff of their intended termination. That 
the defendant-claimants did quit work to return to school is 
further supported by the fact that in January, 1978, claimant 
Nolisa requested a leave of absence from plaintiff's employment 
to attend school, and did take such a leave of absence from 
hooary 10, 1978 to March 15, 1978. 
stated: 
The Appeal Referee's decision dated February 15, 1979 
On September 9, 1978, the claimants both advised their 
employer that they were quitting on September 23, 
1978. It was the employer's understanding that the 
claimants were quitting to attend school. 
The claimants worked swing shift and had been 
attending school during the time they worked for 
Pepperidge Farms. They entered school Fall Quarter 
1978 and are both attending at the present time. 
The reasoning of the Appeal Referee was supported by 
~bstantial evidence that the claimants voluntarily terminated 
t~ir employment with plaintiff for the sole purpose of 
returning to school. (R. 00085, 00086). 
- 17 -
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During the hearing with the Appeal Referee, the 
claimants themselves expressly admitted that they were 
returning to school: 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Johnson 
(R. 00092). 
Now, then, it is indicated that you, uh, Mr. 
Nolisa were returning to school. Is this correct: 
No, it wasn't. Uh, Dale, these people wrote that 
up. I wasn't there. I was just told them. r 
was invited in the plant manager's office. 
Now, excuse me, I have a form here completed~ 
January 9, 1979 showing that you are enrolled, 
starting at Utah State University in September of 
'76 and plan to complete in 1980. 
Yeh. 
Did you attend school in Fall Quarter? 
Yeh. Even when I was working for Pepperidge 
Farm, I was attending school full time. 
You were attending school during the Summer 
Quarter also? 
No, during the summer quarters, I don't attend 
school. 
Well, that's what I sav, you quit September 23 
and school doesn't start until about that time, 
about September 26. 
Yeh. 
Did you enter school on September 26? 
Yes, I did. 
All right. Now, I would ask the same questiO.!!J. 
Mr. Johnson. Did you enter school on Septemb!£ 
26? 
Yes, I did. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
- 18 -
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Since the defendant-claimants quit their jobs with 
plaintiff to return to school and voluntary termination of 
employment for that purpose does not constitute "good cause" 
pursuant to the requirements of section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, claimants terminated their 
employment without good cause and the decision of the Board of 
Review is in error and must be reversed. 
B. Claimants' Unsuccessful Efforts To Be Reclassified 
Does Not Constitute Good Cause For Leaving Work 
Plaintiff's manufacturing operations in Richmond, Utah 
began in 1974. Job classifications were made according to the 
practices of other Pepper idge Farm plan ts in other parts of the 
country. In 1977 plaintiff determined that job 
reclassifications were necessary and a committee of management 
reviewed job responsibilities and reclassified certain employee 
positions. One position affected by the reclassification was 
that of Plant Services Helper. This job was separated in to two 
groups: Plant Services "A" and Plant Services "B". The "A" 
group received higher pay due to their greater responsibilities. 
(R. 00038). 
Claimants Johnson and Nolisa were employed as Plant 
Service Helpers at the time of the reclassification. When 
reclassification was instigated, neither claimant was working 
the same work shift as those employees reclassified as Plant 
Services "Arr. Consequently, both claimants remained in the 
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Plant Services "B" category and their salary was not 
increased. (R. 00098, 00099). 
Claimants contend that plaintiff's refusal to 
reclassify them as Plant Services "A" employees constituted 
good cause for terminating their employment with plaintiff. 
(R. 00062, 00068, 00072). Claimants, however, were not 
justified in leaving work due to their failure to be 
reclassified since: (1) the reclassification was justified and 
necessary; (2) the employees in group "A" received a higher 
wage due to their greater responsibilities; (3) claimants 
received the same salary as all other employees in the "B" 
group; (4) plaintiff reevaluated claimants job classifications 
on two separate occasions only to determine that they were 
proper and appropriate; and (5) claimants had the opportunity 
to bid for the position of Plant Services "A" on at least five 
separate occasions. 
During the hearing with the Appeal Referee, the 
Referee noted that the manner in which an employer assigns its 
jobs is entirely within the province of the employer. (R. 
00098). Despite that province, the reclassification of Plant 
Services to groups "A" and "B" was necessary and the higher 
wages paid to the group "A" employees were justified because of 
their greater responsibilities. As stated by Dale Stokes in 
his affidavit dated May 25, 1979: 
There are distinct and specific responsibiliti7s to a 
Plant Services "A" classification that differ in 
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skill, ability and responsibility than a Plant Services "B" 
employee. Particularly, for example an "A" classification 
includes dissembly and assembly of equipment and machines 
for cleaning purposes. 
(R. 00039) . 
Not only were their responsibilities different from 
those of the Plant Services 11 A11 employees, but claimants 
Johnson and Nolisa did the same work and received the same pay 
as all other employees in the "B 11 group. (R. 00038, 00097). 
Furthermore, at the request of claimants, the reclassification 
of the Plant Service Helpers into groups "A" and 11 B" was 
reviewed by plaintiff in January, 1978, and in August, 1978. 
On both occasions plaintiff determined that the distinction 
between Plant Services "A 11 employees and Plant Services "B" 
employees was proper and that no change should be made in that 
classification. (R. 00039, 00043, 00044). 
That the defendant-claimants failure to obtain 
reclassification was not good cause for leaving the employment 
of plaintiff is further supported by the fact that claimants 
failed to file a formal grievance with plaintiff regarding the 
job classifications. Plaintiff's employee's manual, at page 18 
(R. 00025), provides the appropriate procedure to be followed 
for complaints and problems. Claimants failed to follow those 
Procedures concerning their complaints about the distinctions 
between the group 11 A11 and "B" positions. (R. 00021). 
The merits of claimants allegations that they were 
iustified in quitting because of their classification as Plant 
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Services "B" employees was addressed by the Appeal Referee in 
his decision as follows: 
There is good cau~e for the voluntary leaving of work 
where the facts disclose a real, substantial and 
compelling reason of such nature as would cause a 
reasonable person genuinely desirous of retaining 
employment to take similar action. 
In the present instance the main thrust of the 
claimants' testimonies concerned the grievances they 
felt. resulted ~rom their employment situation. They I 
c~ns1dered their attendance at school to be seco~acy 
since they had attended school before while working et' 
Pepperidge Farms. 
The claimants were being paid the same rate as others 
assigned to the work they were doing and, while they 
may have felt others were being given preferential 
treatment, they had filed a grievance through the 
proper channels for redress. It is considered that 
they reasonably could have been expected to continue 
their employment until such time as the issues had 
been decided rather than quitting to become totally 
unemployed without prospects of other work. 
(R. 00083, 00086). (Emphasis supplied). 
James F. Hannan, dissenting in the Board of Review's 
decision, also recognized that the voluntary termination ~ t~ 
defendant-claimants of their employment with plaintiff due to 
their complaints about the job classifications did not 
constitute a real, substantial and compelling reason of such a 
nature that reasonable persons genuinely desirous of retaining 
employment would also have quit. Mr. Hannan stated: 
I respectfully dissent on the grounds that the 
claimant chose to remain employed for 16 months after 
the job classification issue arose. It appears, 
therefore, that his decision to terminate was .. 
motivated by something other than the job cond1~· 
(R. 00031, 00033). (Emphasis supplied). 
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Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the 
claimants' unsuccessful efforts to be reclassified as Plant 
services "A" employees did not constitute "good cause" for 
quitting their jobs is the fact that on at least five separate 
occasions, both claimants had the opportunity to bid for that 
position and neither Johnson nor Nolisa made any effort to do 
so. (R. 00039). 
Concerning the failure of the defendant-claimants to 
bid for the position of Plant Services "A" employee, the 
testimony of Mr. Dale Stokes at the hearing with the Appeal 
Referee is enlightening: 
Referee 
Stokes 
Referee 
Stokes 
Referee 
Stokes 
Referee 
Stokes 
Well, I will ask him the question concerning 
that. Is this a company policy to allot jobs on 
seniority, Mr. Stokes? 
It is. When the jobs were created, they were 
offered on a seniority basis to those people who 
were working on the night owl shift. 
On the night shift? 
That's correct. 
Was that where thses (sic) gentlemen were 
employed? 
They were employed on the afternoon, p.m. shift; 
however, on at least five different occasions 
subsequent to the reevaluation of the job, the 
job was posted for bid. On none of those 
occasions did either gentlemen bid. 
In other words, the job was posted for bidding on 
the bulletin board? 
That's correct. 
(R. 00098, 00099). (Emphasis supplied) . 
Mr. Stokes testified further: 
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Stokes 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Nolisa 
Referee 
Stokes 
Referee 
Stokes 
Referee 
Stokes 
Jobs were posted on the board in the normal 
process of our bidding procedure 
Are they sent there, are they sent about eight 
months or nine months, when they sent out them? 
Excuse me, Mr. Nolisa, will you allow him the 
courtesy of completing his statement before you 
interrupt him? 
I will. 
All right, fine. Now, Mr. Stokes has been 
talking and let him finish his statement 
concerning that, please. 
When the jobs came open, became available. 
When the jobs were available so you were going to 
hire somebody for those positions? 
Right. Then they were posted in various [places) 
conspicuous to all employees for a minimum of 48 
hours before the job was actually filled. 
Employees desiring to bid onto those jobs were 
requested to follow the normal bid procedure 
which is to indicate their desire to have the job 
by filling out a book in personnel or giving a 
note to personnel. 
And on no occasion was that done by either Mr. 
Johnson or Nolisa, to your knowledge? 
That is correct. 
(R. 00099, 00100). (Emphasis supplied). 
A consideration of the above factors, including the 
fact that both claimants could have become Plant Services "A" 
employees had they only bid for that position on one of the 
many occasions it was posted for bidding, makes it clear that 
the claimants' dissatisfaction with their working conditions in 
addition to their failure to obtain the classification of Plant 
Services "A" employees did not constitute good cause for 
- 24 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
voluntary termination of their employment. Accordingly, the 
decision of the Board of Review determining claimants to be 
eligible for unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to 
January 27, 1979 should be reversed. 
c. Justified Reprimand By Employer Does Not 
Constitute Good Cause For Voluntary Termination 
Section 35-4-5(a) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, disqualifies a claimant from receiving unemployment 
compensation where the claimant-employee terminates his 
employment because of a justified reprimand by his employer for 
misconduct. Although no Utah case appears to be on point, 
other jurisdictions addressing the issue have consistently held 
such a termination to be without good cause. 
In Barajas v. Industrial Commissio~, 487 P.2d 598 
(Colo. 1971) , the Court ruled that the claimant was 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits after he quit 
because he refused to be laid-off for ten days as discipline 
for his "excessive absenteeism and tardiness and for failure to 
Punch the time clock." 
The case of Nenoff v. Culligan Soft Water, 542 P.2d 
837 (Idaho 1975), involved a claimant who had left his 
employment rather than accept his employer's restriction of 
denying him access to the off ice at night. The Industrial 
Commission denied the claimant unemployment benefits because he 
had voluntarily left his employment without good cause. On 
- 25 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
Ind is trial Commission. See also, Unemoloymen t Compensation 
Board of Review v. Tune, 350 A. 2d 876 (Pa. 1976), where it was 
held that voluntary termination of ones employment because of 
being suspended does not entitle the claimant to recover 
unemployment compensation. 
Claimants Johnson and Nolisa were disciplined on 
August 31, 1978 for insubordination. Johnson was suspended for 
two days without pay and Nolisa for five days. (R. 00037). 
Although claimants allege that they were treated unfairly, bott 
claimants were justifiably reprimanded under the circumstances, 
since they refused to perform a job which was no different fro: 
jobs requested to be done and performed by them on numerous 
other occasions during the sixteen month period following the 
job reclassification. (R. 00020, 00021). 
The de fendan t-cla iman ts voluntarily terminated their 
employment with plaintiff. Their notice of termination 
occurred immediately following their suspension without pay for 
insubordination. The discipline imposed by plaintiff was 
justified and claimants' termination of their employment~ 
retaliation to that discipline was without good cause. 
Consequently, the order entitling the defendant-claimants to ' 
receive unemployment compensation from December 17, 1978 to 
January 27, 1979 must be reversed. 
- 26 -
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the 
Appeal Referee determining the defendant-claimants to be 
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits from December 17, 
1978 to January 27, 1979 and establishing an overpayment of 
compensation to claimants should be affirmed, and the decision 
of the Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 
Industrial Commission of Utah, should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of October, 1979. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By:m.M.uJ... \.0, ~ 
Daniel W. Anderson 
M. Byron Fisher 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
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Services, Inc., 385-24th Street, Suite 522, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
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Daniel W. Anderson 
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